Abstract We demonstrate and apply methods for assessing global, system-scale effects on energy and greenhouse emissions of offset programs that explicitly consider the rules by which energy-based offset credits are awarded. We compare our approach to idealized calculations in which all regions, including those without mitigation obligations, face a common carbon tax. We find a substantial gap between potential reductions in emissions and those realized in a suite of hypothetical offset assignment protocols as well as between offset creation and systemscales emissions mitigation, even when project-scale additionality and compliance issues are absent and baselines are known with certainty. In the worst cases, seemingly reasonable rules were counterproductive-i.e. increased global carbon emissions, despite strictly meeting additionality and baseline requirements. But, even when we modified the rules for creating offsets to reflect more closely implementation practices, there remained a large gap between potential and realized mitigation. This difference is systemic and traces to the basic nature of offsets. Offsets subsidize the deployment of non-emitting technologies instead of penalizing the use of emitting technologies. As a consequence, offsets lower the cost of energy, and encourage greater use energy rather than its conservation. Thus, even in well-crafted programs, it is impossible to capture the full economic potential because the program lacks a means by which to engage energy conservation. We demonstrate that while offsets programs reduce the cost to regions with emissions caps, they may achieve this result at the expense of reduced global emissions mitigation.
Introduction and background
International offsets have been a staple of strategies to limit the cost of greenhouse gas emissions mitigation since the Kyoto Protocol. Offsets were designed to both expand the domain of emissions mitigation beyond the borders of mitigating regions, and reduce the cost of achieving an emissions mitigation goal. They were motivated by the idea that costs of meeting a given emissions limit could be reduced if opportunities outside of the control region were accessed. Richels, et al. (1999) referred to this as Bwhere flexibility.^The concept was incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol, where it is called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It has subsequently incorporated in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and is a staple of proposed legislation in the United States, for example, McCainLieberman (2003 McCainLieberman ( , 2005 McCainLieberman ( , 2007 . System-scale estimates of emissions mitigation potential in a non-participating region has been derived calculating the emissions mitigation that the region would achieve had it adopted a carbon tax equivalent to the price of an emissions allowance in the region with a formal emissions cap-and-trade system and then applying a Bprogram efficiency^scalar. While this method yields guidance as to the maximum potential available mitigation at system scales, it does not provide any guidance with regard to the consequences of implementing an explicit offsets regime.
The assessment of projects and/or crediting methods to assign offset credits have employed a different set of tools and methods, which implement an explicit set of rules, but lack the capacity to assess direct-plus-indirect consequences at system scales. What have been missing from the tool kit have been methods to assess the system-scale consequences of real offsets programs. Such methods are needed to supplement the present suite of methods that include project scale assessments and life cycle analysis and could be used to help design more efficient systems. We find that the sum of estimates of project-scale emissions mitigation are generally not equivalent to emissions mitigation at systems scales, even where additionality and crediting baseline requirements are strictly satisfied. We employ the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM), an integrated assessment model (IAM), to provide quantitative estimates of potential mitigation, offset creation where economic agents are awarded offset credits by complying with a set of explicit rules, and net global system emissions mitigation. We find that as project scale research has shown, the rules matter and provide a tool of analysis capable of supplementing present methods to help understand global system-scale effects. While specific programs, such as CDM can have multiple objectives, the focus of this paper is limited to the emissions mitigation.
Offsets
Emissions allowances allocated under cap-and-trade and offsets programs that assign emissions mitigation credits to activities undertaken outside the cap-and-trade program are importantly different. At the most fundamental level, emissions allowances define a right to release a controlled substance into the environment, while offsets are an estimate of emissions reductions attributable to a specific activity. Emissions allowances create an economic cost associated with emissions, while offsets rely on subsidies to encourage non-emitting activities.
Offsets are created in regions without an emissions limitation for use as a means of compliance by parties with an emissions limitation. Since the objective of an offsets program is to reduce the cost of achieving a given emissions limit, an important principle in creating an offset is that a project should be awarded no more offset credits than the amount by which emissions have been reduced. Offsets should not be awarded to projects that would have been undertaken in the absence of an offsets program and should not be awarded to projects that fail to decrease emissions. This concept is referred to as Badditionality^. In principle, the offset associated with a project is simply the difference between Bproject direct emissions^, i.e. emissions generated by the project and the Bcrediting baseline^, an estimate of emissions that would have occurred without the project. That amount in turn can be modified to account for other considerations, but is the basis for determining the magnitude of the project's offset credit.
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Calculation of the project direct emissions is a relatively simple matter compared with determining the amount of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the project. This is a major problem in the real world, but not in a model like GCAM in which both a world with and without an offsets program can be observed.
There is little doubt that potential mitigation actions exist in regions lacking an emissions limit. Richels, et al. (1999) estimated that potential by assuming that agents outside the cap would act as if they faced the same permit price as those under the cap. This approach has been employed by other IAMs (e.g. Fawcett, Fawcett, 2010; EIA, 2009) . By varying the carbon price/tax in non-participating regions one can sketch out a Marginal Abatement Curve (MAC). For non-participating regions the MAC traces the economic potential that exists at alternative carbon prices.
However, doubt emerged almost as soon as the idea of offsets, regarding the degree to which this potential could be realized in practice (Fisher, 2005; Wara and Victor, 2008; Wara, 2008; Millard-Ball and Ortolano 2010; Erikson, et al. 2014) . Various adjustments have been made to the simple aggregate economic (MAC) approach to recognize that any real system would be unable to fully realize the economic potential calculated in a MAC. A common approach to addressing the problem was to simply reduce the amount of emissions mitigation by an arbitrary factor to adjust for Bprogram efficiency^ (Fawcett, 2010; EIA, 2009 , Popp, 2011 . At the same time, methods have been developed using microeconomic techniques to operationalize offsets programs, such as CDM, (Wara and Victor, 2008; Wara, 2008; MillardBall and Ortolano 2010; Popp, 2011) . The main problem with all of the approaches developed to date is that they assume either explicitly or implicitly that if the additivity and baseline conditions were realized in fact that global emissions mitigation and the assignment of offset credits would be essentially equal. In contrast, the MAC approach assumes that the application of an adjustment factor creates the equality.
In this paper, we begin with the rules by which offsets are assigned to activities, i.e. additionality and crediting baseline, enforce these conditions exactly, and then ask how many offsets would be created, by whom, and what are the resulting consequences for the regional and global economic systems? Rather than assume that offsets and mitigation are equivalent up to an assumed scalar, we estimate each in the context of an integrated global economic system taking into account sectoral, regional, and global system interaction effects. We can compare each to an associated regional economic potential to assess performance.
We focus on the carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions implications of offsets. We refrain from commenting on non-emissions implications for such outcomes as economic development, which can be very important.
2 Our contribution is not to attempt to replace bottom-up methodologies, but rather to demonstrate techniques that can be used to assess the larger implications, including system scale direct and indirect feedbacks. Note, however, that while the methods that we develop could in principle be applied to analyze the performance of the CDM, this is NOT a paper about CDM. It is a paper about demonstrating a technique of analysis with broad application to offsets programs.
The rules used to calculate the offset program are critically important to shaping both the magnitude of offsets created and the net effect on global energy, economy, and land-use emissions. We start by focusing on offsets from power production. We show that even when both additionality and crediting baseline rules are strictly met that sectoral, regional and global system interaction effects can nonetheless lead to different macro-scale outcomes. The problems we identify are not technical, but systemic. They derive from the fact that unlike a tax, which penalizes emitting technology, offsets are created through a reward for deployment of non-emitting technology. The techniques we demonstrate here are general and are applicable to the analysis of a wide range of offset rules and coverage, some of which we explore in this paper.
Approach
We explicitly model both the rules used for establishing the magnitude of offsets generated by an individual project and the economic incentives for construction of such a project using a regionally disaggregated, technologically detailed, model of human and physical Earth systems, GCAM (Calvin, et al. 2011) . GCAM like other IAMs, simulates the behavior of a range of economic agents making decisions about the supplies of and demands for various resources. GCAM has energy, agriculture, land use, macro-economy and climate modules coupled in a comprehensive computational framework. IAMs are attractive tools of analysis because they have global scope, time-horizons that range from decades to a century, but also regional, sectoral and technology detail, with economic agents whose behavior is explicitly modeled, and that interact with all of the other agents in the global system. While a detailed description of GCAM and its components is contained in Calvin et al. (2011) , a summary of some of the salient features of GCAM is contained in on line supporting material.
We will use the GCAM reference scenario to provide an exact description of the world without an offsets program. The GCAM reference scenario employs assumptions about population, labor productivity (which determines GDP), and technology availability taken from Thomson, et al. (2011) . Our offset scenarios are identical to our reference scenario in regard to population, labor productivity, and technology assumptions and differ only in the 2 In addition to lowering the cost of meeting an emissions limitation goal CDM has the companion objective of facilitating sustainable economic development. A substantial literature has emerged exploring the performance of CDM in both domains, e.g. Lema and Lema (2013) examine CDMs role in technology transfer; Subbarao and Lloyd (2011) evaluate CDM as a mechanism for economic development and show limited success and go on to question the ability of a single policy instrument to deliver both reduced costs of CO 2 emissions while enhancing economic development; Zhang and Wang (2011) empirically test the ability of CDM to deliver local air quality in addition to producing CERs and find little evidence for co-benefits; Popp (2011) reviews the broad literature on CDM, noting issues with additionality as well reviewing the role of CDM as a mechanism for clean economic development. addition of our hypothetical offsets program. Any differences between those two scenarios is directly attributable to the introduction of the offsets program.
Our generic offsets program assigns offset credits, referred to as Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) certificates, to projects that meet both the additionality and crediting baseline requirements. We estimate the magnitude of CERs that might be introduced into an offsets market by region in the year 2020 for a program initiated in 2015.
We then define alternative crediting baselines and calculate the supply of credits that would qualify under those rules for various market prices. We then report:
1. Offsets credits supply from regions which we assume have no emissions limits and eligible to create CER certificates (China, India, Other South and East Asia, Mideast, Africa, Latin America). 2. Global emissions with the offsets program in place, from which net emissions abatement are computed relative to the Reference Case. 3. Economic potential emissions mitigation using the MAC approach a la Richels, et al. (1999) .
For simplicity of exposition, we initially assume an offsets program based on the BOperating Margin^(OM) method and will then compare this approach to the BCombined Margin^(CM) method in Section 5. 3 The OM method for assigning CDRs is summarized below. We assume that monitoring, verification and transaction costs are negligible. Offset Calculation Difference between facility emissions (CO 2 /kWh) and power sector average in the reference scenario, times the facility's power produced.
Alternative baseline formulations are explored in Section 5. An important feature of an offsets program that subsidizes the production of new investments in low-emitting technologies rather than increasing the cost of new investments in highemitting technologies is that it affects the marginal cost of electricity. Rather than increasing the cost of producing electricity as an emissions tax would, the offsets program, reduces the marginal cost of producing electricity. We discuss the importance of this effect in the context of our numerical results. We also describe the GCAM treatment of power generation in the Online Supplemental Material. A fuller description is available in Calvin et al. (2011) . Figure 1 summarizes the results of our calculations for the year 2020 including, potential economic emissions mitigation in qualifying regions, offset credits supplied by qualifying regions under the OM method of calculation, and net abatement or change in emissions in the qualifying regions resulting from the offsets program.
Numerical results
As might be anticipated, positive offsets prices induce positive offset credits as well as positive economic potential mitigation. The quantity of offsets supplied and economic potential are larger at higher offset prices.
The most striking feature of Fig. 1 is the net change in global CO 2 emissions resulting from the offsets program. The supply of offsets is much larger than the net change in global CO 2 emissions, resulting in overpayment. At $20/tonCO 2 , the overpayment amounts to $15 billion. Furthermore, the offsets program is counterproductive, increasing net global CO 2 emissions, though there is no reason in principle that the offsets program needs to produce that result.
The perverse consequence of the offset program is the result of indirect feedback effects engendered by the program. The offsets price is a subsidy that both induces additional supply of the credited activity, but also makes electric power cheaper. The problem is that whereas a tax encourages energy conservation, the subsidy encourages energy use. The lower price of electricity induces greater electricity sales, as end users substitute away from other more expensive fuels. The effect of offset payments on electricity is exactly the reverse of the effect of a carbon tax. Whereas a carbon tax increases the price of electricity lowering its demand, offsets reduce the price of electricity increasing its demand (Fig. 2, Panel A) . 4 Higher electricity prices reduce the demand for power, while lower prices expand use (Fig. 2, Panel B) . This in turn is reflected in a change in the fuel mix used to produce power (Fig. 2, Panel C) . A carbon tax has the effect of reducing total power production largely by backing out fossil fuel electricity production, thereby reducing emissions. Low-emissions energy technologies expand their deployment modestly under a carbon tax. In contrast, the subsidy character of payments for offsets expands the production of power, including both low-emission and high-emission investments.
Given the terms of the offset program, any generating facility with carbon-to-electricity ratios lower than the GCAM reference scenario is eligible for offsets. Thus, renewable power, nuclear power, and power produced using natural gas all qualify. Additionally, in some regions (e.g., China and India), coal IGCC power plants also qualify. As a result, all expand their deployment. In addition, some additional capacity is installed to meet the greater demand for power at the new, lower prices of carbon. The expanded use of fossil fuels, both due to the credits received by these facilities and the increased electricity demand, leads to an increase in 4 Under an economy-wide carbon tax (as opposed to a sector-only carbon tax) power generation can expand even though its price rises. This can occur because there are two effects. On the one hand the carbon tax increases the price of power, reducing demand as conserving options become more attractive. On the other hand, the economywide tax increases the price of all of electricity's fossil-fuel competitors' rises even more than the increase in the price of power, resulting in a well-known substitution of electricity for fossil fuels in end-use sectors. Whether or not total generation increases or decreases depends on the balance of the two countervailing effects. CO 2 production, despite the fact that the offsets program only pays for new power sources that reduce the carbon-to-electricity ratio. A variety of methods have been developed to limit the deployment of technologies such as advanced fossil fuels. In Section 5 we will see that introducing such limits changes the quantitative but not qualitative result. A micro-economic illustration of the different effects of a carbon tax and offset subsidy on industry-level decisions is contained in the On-line Supplemental Material.
Sensitivity of the results to alternative crediting assumptions
Programs such as CDM attempt to ensure that the most obvious pitfalls associated with offset programs are avoided. Every attempt is made to insure that facilities that would have come on line in a reference scenario are not given offset credits as was assumed in the preceding section. In addition, considerations are often made to avoid crediting questionable projects. For example, the Mundra project in India (the country's first supercritical coal plant) sought CDM credits and was rejected.
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In this section we explore the effect of such additional considerations. For example, we consider one case in which offsets cannot be awarded to fossil fuel projects. In all, we consider four different groups of assumptions: the crediting baseline, the eligible activities, the eligible sectors, and the delivery risk.
Sensitivity to the crediting baseline
The OM method is not the only method for crediting offsets available. For example, the CDM uses a Combined Margin (CM) approach, which weights the carbon-to-electricity ratio of the most recent years of capacity additions more heavily when establishing the crediting baseline. Alternatively, offsets could be computed using the carbon-to-electricity ratio from a prior year or a particular technology. 5 We are indebted to David Victor for bringing this example to our attention. . Nonetheless, the other forces are at work in all cases, namely the subsidization of low carbon energy deployment lowers power generation costs, expanding the power market, benefiting all technologies. While the CM method dramatically reduces the increase in emissions under the offsets program, it does not deliver the economic potential. The feedback effect through reduced power prices benefits fossil fuels as well as renewable energy forms. Thus, the expanded deployment of renewable energy forms, with zero emissions is accompanied by expanded deployment of some fossil fuel power production as well.
Sensitivity to eligible activities
The initial results allowed any electricity technology with a lower carbon-to-electricity ratio than the GCAM reference to supply offsets. This included fossil power plants (e.g., natural gas combined cycle and coal IGCC) and nuclear generating facilities. We note that the former releases net fossil fuel emissions, 6 while the latter is excluded in some existing programs such as CDM. Here, we test the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of these technologies from the offsets program.
Excluding nuclear power from offset eligibility decreases the supply of offsets, as nuclear generated a significant fraction of the offset credits in the all technology case (Fig. 3, Panel B) . This reduction in offsets supply reduces overpayment from $15 to $12 billion. However, emissions increase even more when nuclear is excluded.
Excluding fossil fuel power plants also reduces the supply of offsets from the all technology case. In this case, however, emissions are reduced from their Reference levels when offsets are included. The reduction in emissions is achieved because the expansion in total electricity is more modest than in the all technologies case. And, although coal power does increase, much of the expansion in electricity generation is comprised of wind and nuclear power (Fig. 3,  Panel B) . While offset supply and emissions both decline when fossil fuel power plants are excluded from the program, the amount of offsets sold still far exceeds the emissions abatement achieved, resulting in overpayment on the order of $8 billion.
Sensitivity to eligible sectors
The results presented in Section 4 assume that only electric generating facilities are eligible to supply offsets. However, potential opportunities to reduce energy and emissions exist in the end-use sectors as well. In principle, accessing such opportunities could counterbalance the effects of the lower electricity price created in the power sector element of the offsets program. We test the sensitivity of our results to the set of eligible sectors by expanding the offsets program to the entire economy. We do this by assuming that any energy technology with a lower carbon-to-energy ratio than the GCAM reference can supply offsets. This program includes refineries, industrial facilities, transportation, and buildings, in addition to electricity generating facilities. Importantly, when defining the project's direct emissions for the end-use sectors (buildings, transportation, and industry), electricity and refined liquids are treated as zero emissions carriers, as the incentives to decarbonize these fuels are undertaken at the generating facility or refinery. That is, we assume the electricity and refinery offsets programs are successful when estimating the project direct emissions in the end-use sectors.
The effect of expanding the scope of the offsets program to energy end-use sectors, however only magnifies the central problem, which is that offsets programs are a subsidy to energy technology investments, which has the unavoidable consequence of expanding energy use. In fact, the problem is exacerbated when the program is expanded. Electric power generation expands not only because the cost of power is reduced due to the offsets credits provided to generating facility, but electric power is subsidized at the end use because it is expected to be lower carbon than other fuel options. As a result, the expansion of electricity generation is larger than in the electric sector only case, with much of this power coming from coal and gas (Fig. 3, Panel C) .
Delivery risk
Not every offset-motivated project that is started is successful. A wind farm may not deliver the power that was anticipated, for example. The market for offsets will take that possibility into account. Incorporating deliver risk into the analysis results in a reduction in the amount of offsets credits generated by a particular project to reflect the possibility that such a project will not deliver its promised abatement. We have taken quantitative estimates from Rose, et al. (2013) and applied them to our estimates of offset supply. These estimates, which differ by region and technology, are multiplied by the credit calculated previously. The result is a smaller volume of expected offsets at any price, or equivalently, any bundle of offsets sells at a corresponding discount. While this factor effectively reduces the supply of offsets, it does not reduce emissions. The delivery risks used in this case set the offsets credits for nuclear to zero, which we showed in Section 5.2 leads to a reduction in emissions. Additionally, delivery risks reduce the payment to utilities; thus, a higher offset price is needed to induce a shift in profitability among technologies than was required without delivery risk. As a result, overpayment still occurs and abatement does not when delivery risk is considered.
Interactions between offsets and emissions limitation programs
To explore to interactions between offsets and emissions limitations, we hypothesize a policy regime in which the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Japan (to which we refer as BGroup 1^) take on emissions limits, which decline linearly over the period to 2050 by 80 % relative to 2005. No banking or borrowing is allowed. Compliance in the emissions control regions can be implemented either by using emissions allowances issued by the control regions or by offsets, i.e. CERs. To illustrate the interactions, we assume that the OM method is used to set the crediting baseline, all sectors are eligible, and delivery risks are considered. We contrast that to both a scenario in which no offsets are allowed, and one in which the full economic potential of mitigation in offset-supply regions is somehow accessed. Figure 4 summarizes the results. When no offsets are allowed for compliance purposes, the carbon price is $55/tCO 2 in 2020. The emissions mitigation goal is met, with the exception of a small Bleakage^from mitigating regions to non-mitigating regions.
7 Cumulative emissions mitigation between 2020 and 2050 in the United States sums to slightly more than 100 GtCO 2 . Emissions in offset selling regions are somewhat greater after the emissions limits are imposed than they were in the reference scenario due to the lower energy prices that emerge as mitigating regions reduce their demands for fossil fuels.
Allowing the use of offsets in Group 1 to meet their emissions mitigation limits has the anticipated effect of reducing the carbon price, to $23/tCO 2 in 2020. Offsets account for more than half of all compliance measures. Cumulative mitigation in the USA declines to roughly 45 GtCO 2 . Net cumulative emissions mitigation under the offset-augmented program falls below 100 GtCO 2 . We contrast the BSubsidy Offsets^and BNo Offsets^to the idealized BEconomic Potential^calculation. The latter has a carbon price of less than $14/tCO2, with 78 % of emissions reductions occurring outside of Group 1.
Summary and comments
We have demonstrated a method by which to assess the system-scale consequences of offsets programs using GCAM. We have shown that explicit consideration of the rules by which offsets credits are assigned in GCAM leads to a different understanding of the system-scale effects of offset programs than is available using either the MAC curve approach or summing 7 Leakage is a well-studied problem that emerges when some regions mitigate and others do not. In a nutshell, the problem is that the cost of emissions-intensive products rises in mitigating regions causing regions without an emissions limitation obligation to have a comparative advantage. Production of emissions-intensive goods rises in regions without an emissions limitation causing their emissions to rise relative to a reference scenario without emissions limits. In addition, reduced demand for fossil fuels lowers their world price, encouraging greater use in non-mitigating regions. See for example, Calvin, et al. (2009 ), Boehringer, et al. (2010 , Gerlagh and Kuik (2014) , and Bollen, et al. (2012). project-scale assessments. Of course, the specific quantitative calculations are subject to the usual caveats regarding uncertainty that surround them. For example, there is no reason in principle that the system scale effect of an OM program should actually expand global emissions. That result is model-specific as well as uncertain.
On the other hand, the qualitative difference between the results we show here and the MAC curve approach stem from a deep structural source that traces to the difference between a tax and a subsidy. Whereas the tax provides an incentive for energy conservation, the subsidy encourages greater use of energy. The differences between the results we show here and those that would emerge from the summation of project-scale estimates stem from the same source, system-scale feedback effects, even when both the world with an offset program and the alternative without the program are known with certainty, eliminating any source of error in the calculation of additionality or compliance. The main conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that system-scale effects matter and depend strongly on the specific rules used to assign offsets.
Our methods highlight indirect, systemic effects associated with the subsidy nature of offset programs. The offset subsidy lowers the cost of electricity, inducing greater demand and production. In extreme cases, as we have shown, the feedback can be sufficiently large as to overwhelm the benefits from the subsidized offset project. In principle, it might be possible to prevent electric utilities from lowering their prices, for example, by imposing a power tax sufficient to offset the subsidy effect. That would require that the host region be willing to impose such a countervailing intervention. It is not clear what incentives exist to induce such actions. The host region benefits from lower energy prices, both politically and economically in that lower energy prices foster economic growth. On the other hand, such a tax is a source of revenue to the government.
Coupled to a regional program of emissions limitations as a cost control mechanism we found that offsets lowered costs, but at the expense of reduced emissions mitigation.
